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I. INTRODUCTION
Long departed, the founding fathers nevertheless continue to exert
an appreciable influence upon constitutional jurisprudence. They retain a
distinctly audible voice in the national discourse, and they remain con-
clusive authorities in public deliberation. This is so, despite strident calls
for an end to the submissive deference afforded them in contemporary
America. 1
The enduring practice to rely upon the founders is most prominent
in the judiciary. Jurists have long looked to the founders for guidance in
elaborating the freedoms and liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights,
particularly the Establishment Clause.2 In expounding their Establish-
ment Clause judgments, jurists have commonly invoked the views or
actions of the founders as their decisional authority.
Scholars have taken note of this curious feature of American juris-
prudence. "Because of the reverence most Americans have for the na-
tion's founders," comments one writer, "the nation is generally commit-
ted, although sometimes excessively it would seem, to the founders' in-
tentions. We hang on their words as if they were Scripture." 3 This seems
to candidly capture the curious inclination to seek validation from the
nation's colonial forefathers. As another scholar has observed in this re-
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1. One scholar, for instance, has argued that "[t]he framers, after all, are dead, and in the con-
temporary world, their views are neither relevant nor morally binding." CRAIG R. DUCAT, MODES OF
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 103 (1978).
2. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
3. Derek H. Davis, Reflections on Moral Decline in America: Consulting the Founding Fa-
thers' Views on the Roles of Church and State in Crafting the Good Society, 42 J. CHURCH & ST.
237, 237 (2000).
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gard, the tendency to refer to the constitutional framers as a short answer
to legal questions likely finds its origin in the founders' time-honored
and long-established image as a super-legislature of sorts. "Just as our
representatives in Congress have the power to tell us how to act, so do, in
a more indirect way, the Framers.",4 Another insightful thinker has articu-
lated this point quite well with respect to religion: "The Framer's [sic]
model of religion is the most contested because of its legitimating power,
the difficulty of uncovering its historical nature and its use to bolster cur-
rent legal formulas.",5
Indeed, jurists unwaveringly turn to the founders to substantiate
their Establishment Clause decisions.6 The founding fathers, in effect,
serve as an interpretative compass. But this should not necessarily be
so-at least not exclusively. In giving meaning to the Establishment
Clause, jurists should also turn to the framers and ratifiers of the Four-
teenth Amendment, 7 which was drafted and ratified nearly a full century
4. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 886
(1996).
5. Rebecca Redwood French, From Yoder to Yoda: Models of Traditional, Modern, and Post-
modern Religion in U.S. Constitutional Law, 41 ARIZ. L. REV. 49, 91 (1999).
6. See discussion infra Part I.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV:
Section I. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the ju-
risdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according
to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, exclud-
ing Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors
for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is
denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion,
or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens
twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United
States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Con-
gress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as
an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United
States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or
comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House,
remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing
insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any
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after the Establishment Clause and the other amendments that constitute
the Bill of Rights. The Fourteenth Amendment transformed the original
meaning of the civil protections preserved in the Bill of Rights. In light
of the transformative effect of the Fourteenth Amendment, those respon-
sible for its conception and confirmation must be consulted-of course in
concert with Jefferson, Madison, and other founding leaders-in order to
fully and properly gauge the meaning of the modem Establishment
Clause.
A. Conventional Narrative
Akhil Reed Amar, hailed as "the leading liberal constitutional law
professor of his generation," 8 has illuminated a peculiar feature of
American constitutional jurisprudence. In his sequel to The Bill of Rights
As a Constitution,9 Amar explains that "in the very process of being ab-
sorbed into the Fourteenth Amendment, various rights and freedoms of
the original Bill [were] subtly but importantly transformed in much the
same way the Bill of Rights transformed language it had absorbed from
still earlier sources."10 In a fuller book treatment of the questions he ex-
plores in these two articles, Amar eloquently sheds light upon a glaring
deficiency in the current discourse on the meaning of the civil rights and
liberties shielded under the cover of the Bill of Rights:
The conventional narrative focuses on those present at the Crea-
tion-on the hasty oversights and omissions in the last days of a hot
summer in Philadelphia; on the centrality of the (absence of a) Bill
of Rights in ratification debates; and on the quick repair worked by
the First Congress, fixing in place the keystone of the arch of lib-
erty. And we all lived happily ever after.
There is some truth in this stock story so far as it goes, but it doesn't
go far enough. Most dramatically, it ignores the ways in which the
Reconstruction generation-not their Founding fathers or grandfa-
State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebel-
lion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but
all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
8. Steven G. Calabresi, We Are All Federalists, We Are All Republicans: Holism, Synthesis,
and the Fourteenth Amendment, 87 GEO. L.J. 2273, 2273 (1999) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR,
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998)).
9. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill ofRights As a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 (1991).
10. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193,
1266 (1992). This passage also appears in AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND
RECONSTRUCTION 223 (1998).
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thers-took a crumbling and somewhat obscure edifice, placed it on
a new, high ground, and remade it so that it truly would stand as a
temple of liberty and justice for all.' 1
The conventional narrative would therefore insist upon a narrow re-
liance on the founding fathers to understand the Bill of Rights. But, as
Amar proves in compelling fashion, this conventional story fails to ac-
knowledge the Fourteenth Amendment's transformation of the Bill of
Rights from its federalist roots to its reconstructionist timbre of individ-
ual and minority rights. 12 Adherence to the conventional narrative results
in a jurisprudential myopia that fails to fully appreciate American consti-
tutional history. Instead of appealing exclusively to Madison, among
other founding figures, as what Amar calls an "anachronistic trope" to
give meaning to the Establishment Clause, those seeking to ascertain its
meaning should also canvass the reconstructionist intentions of the prin-
cipal draftsmen of the Fourteenth Amendment. 13
In effectively juxtaposing "the emblematic drafters, poets, and ora-
tors of the Creation and the Reconstruction," Amar concludes that, if his
thesis is right (and the scholarly community generally believes it is14),
"then many of us are guilty of a kind of curiously selective ancestor wor-
ship-one that gives too much credit to James Madison and not enough
to John Bingham, that celebrates Thomas Jefferson and Patrick Henry
but slights Harriet Beecher Stowe and Frederick Douglass."'' 5
B. Forsaken Authority
Amar is not alone in giving life to this thesis. Constitutional scholar
Kurt Lash has drawn on this Amarian insight to develop a pointed cri-
tique of Establishment Clause jurisprudence. In an influential article,
Lash suggests that jurists have long mistakenly sought to resolve Estab-
lishment Clause disputes by summoning the intentions of the founders as
authority, instead of more properly summoning the views, actions, and
words of those who drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment. 16
11. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 288 (1998).
12. Id. at 291.
13. Id.
14. E.g. Richard L. Aynes, Refined Incorporation and the Fourteenth Amendment, 33 U. RICH.
L. REV. 289 (1999) (book review); Robert J. Cottrol, Structure, Participation, Citizenship, and
Right: Lessons from Akhil Amar's Second and Fourteenth Amendments, 87 GEO. L.J. 2307 (1999)
(book review); Michael J. Gerhardt, The Utility and Significance of Professor Amar's Holistic Rea-
soning, 87 GEO. L.J. 2327 (1999) (book review).
15. AMAR, supra note 11, at 293.
16. Kurt Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the Nonestab-
lishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085 (1995).
[Vol. 28:239
Establishment Clause
Lash's powerful thesis in this context is that the Fourteenth
Amendment imbued the Establishment Clause with significance wholly
different from its founding meaning.17 Specifically, Lash declares the
following common assumption to be wide of the mark: "The historical
period surrounding the adoption of the original Establishment Clause is
directly relevant to determining the intent behind the incorporated Estab-
lishment Clause."' 8 This assumption is irrevocably flawed, contends
Lash in his distinguishing wit, because it "places the Founding cart be-
fore the Incorporation horse."' 9 He continues, giving careful shape to his
metaphor:
Incorporation doctrine assumes that, at some point, the people
changed their collective mind about the role of federalism in the
protection of individual liberties; what was once left to state discre-
tion is now restricted by the Fourteenth Amendment. But if the peo-
ple changed their mind about the role of federalism in the promotion
of individual liberty, perhaps they also changed their mind about the
role of the Establishment Clause.
Lash leaves little doubt that nineteenth century Americans did in-
deed change their minds about the meaning of the Establishment Clause.
And this, he suggests, presents an indisputable reason to question jurists'
enduring reliance upon the Establishment Clause views of the founding
fathers.2 '
To illustrate this misguided dependence upon the founders, Lash
references the seminal Establishment Clause case in American constitu-
tional history: "When the Supreme Court decided Everson v. Board of
Education, it did so with citations to James Madison and Thomas Jeffer-
son, not the members of the thirty-ninth Congress., 22 But the Court
should have looked to the thirty-ninth Congress, the body responsible for
enshrining the revolutionary Fourteenth Amendment. As Lash writes,
time did not stop at the founding. 23 The Fourteenth Amendment has be-
stowed upon the Establishment Clause (or imposed upon the Clause, de-
pending upon one's perspective 24) a connotation much different from its
17. Id. at 1088.
18. Id. at 1087-88 (emphasis added).
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 1099.
22. Id. at 1085 (referring to Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947)).
23. Lash, supra note 16, at 1132.
24. A number of scholars contend that the Fourteenth Amendment does not incorporate the
Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Brose, In Birmingham They Love the Governor: Why
the Fourteenth Amendment Does Not Incorporate the Establishment Clause, 24 OHIO N.U. L. REV. I
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original founding understanding. 25 To Lash, the result is clear: The
meaning of the transformed Establishment Clause is not to be found in
the writings of James Madison or Thomas Jefferson. 26 Instead, as Lash
tells us in persuasive fashion, authority for interpreting the Establishment
Clause more accurately lies in the contemporary understanding of those
responsible for drafting and ratifying the Fourteenth Amendment, which
forever changed the face of the Establishment Clause.27
We may readily perceive two distinguishable elements to Lash's
thesis: (1) Establishment Clause jurisprudence has misguidedly relied
only upon the founding fathers as interpretational authority; and (2) Es-
tablishment Clause jurisprudence should not forsake those individuals
responsible for crafting the Fourteenth Amendment, which has everlast-
ingly amended the original Establishment Clause.
C. Accepting the Invitation
In this piece, I take up the invitation extended by Amar and Lash to
consider the views of the fathers of the Fourteenth Amendment on the
Establishment Clause. The result takes two principal forms. First, I con-
firm the initial element of the Lashian thesis-that jurists look to the
writings of Madison and Jefferson to the exclusion of the nineteenth cen-
tury luminaries from whom emerged the transformative Fourteenth
Amendment. This is chronicled in Part 1I, which focuses on Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence as shaped by the United States Supreme
Court.
Specifically, I examine the practice of justices to rely on the foun-
ders in reaching their Establishment Clause decisions. In most instances
where it has looked to the founding era for guidance, the Supreme Court
has most often appealed to the establishment-related views of Thomas
Jefferson 28 and James Madison, 29 although the Court has also invoked
(1998); William K. Lietzau, Rediscovering the Establishment Clause: Federalism and the Rollback
of Incorporation, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1191 (1990); Joseph M. Snee, Religious Disestablishment and
the Fourteenth Amendment, 1954 WASH. U. L.Q. 371, 372-73; Note, Rethinking the Incorporation
of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1700 (1992).
25. Lash, supra note 16, at 1132.
26. Id. at 1088.
27. Id.
28. For instance, justices have often invoked Jefferson's Bill for Establishing Religious Free-
dom, reprinted in 2 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 546 (J. Boyd ed. 1950). In their Establishment
Clause pronouncements. See, e.g., Locke v. Davey, 124 S. Ct. 1307, 1314 n.6 (2004); Zelman v.
Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711 (Souter, J., dissenting); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 870
n.1 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 561 (1997) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 870 (1995) (Souter,
J., dissenting); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 606 (1987) (Powell, J., concurring); Comm. for
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the "founders" or "framers" as its decisional authority. The Supreme
Court has invoked these founding leaders to the exclusion of any similar
or even nominal reference to the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment.3 °
This review of jurisprudence offers a systematic look at every Es-
tablishment Clause case to have reached the docket of the United States
Supreme Court since 1947. That year is of particular significance, for it
marks the incorporation of the Establishment Clause, which the Court
articulated in its influential establishment case, Everson v. Board of Edu-
cation.31 Through the intervening years there have been a total of forty-
six other cases-forty-seven in total-in which establishment issues con-
stituted the core legal quandary. I pose two questions as I review the
Court's opinion in each suit: (1) In contemplating the meaning of the
Establishment Clause, does the Court invoke an interpretational author-
ity; and (2) if yes, does the Court brandish as its interpretational authority
the founders, to the exclusion of any reference to the intentions of the
reconstructionists who breathed new meaning into the Establishment
Clause?
Significantly, for each of the forty-seven cases reviewed below,
when the answer to the first question is affirmative, the answer to the
second is invariably also affirmative. Moreover, when the Court has
looked to historical sources to guide its thinking in resolving an estab-
lishment dispute, the Court has abidingly turned to Madison or Jefferson,
or to the broader "framers" or "founders." The Court has neither consid-
Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 n.28 (1973); Sch. Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 259 n.25 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring); Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947); see also Daniel L. Dreisbach, Thomas Jefferson andBills Number 82-
86 of the Revision of the Laws of Virginia, 1776-1786: New Light on the Jeffersonian Model of
Church-State Relations, 69 N.C. L. REV. 159, 173 n.77 (1990) (listing a similar catalogue of cases).
29. The Court has also routinely turned to Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, reprinted
in 8 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 301 (W. Rachal, R. Rutland, B. Ripel & F. Teute eds. 1973)
(1785), to inform its resolution of Establishment Clause matters. E.g., Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist.
v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301, 2332 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring); Locke, 124 S. Ct. at 1314;
Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 243 (1997) (Souter, J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577,
590 (1992); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341 n.2 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53
n.38 (1985); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 804 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Meek v. Pit-
tinger, 421 U.S. 349, 382 n.4 (1975) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Walz v. Tax
Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 705 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Engel v. Vitale,
370 U.S. 421, 431 n.13, 432 n.15, 436 n.22 (1962); see also Dreisbach, supra note 28, at 173 n.78
(listing a similar catalogue of cases).
30. See discussion infra Part 1I.
31. 330 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1947) (incorporating the Establishment Clause); see also Akhil Reed
Amar, Some Notes on the Establishment Clause, 2 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 12 (1996) (noting
that the incorporation of the Establishment Clause first occurred in Everson).
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ered nor appealed to authorities from the Reconstruction era. This find-
ing is noteworthy, for it substantiates the first element of Lash's estab-
lishment thesis. What is more, this finding reinforces the deficiency of
the conventional constitutional narrative and bolsters Amar's broader,
more sweeping observation, from which Lash's thesis derives. As a final
note on this element of this article, the jurisprudence review includes
only establishment cases. I do not consider free exercise cases, nor do I
consider mixed religious cases.32
The second focus of this piece-which forms the remainder of the
text-speaks to the other element of Lash's thesis, one that overlaps with
Amar's. In order to understand the transformed Establishment Clause,
one ought not look exclusively to the writings of James Madison or to
those of Thomas Jefferson. Instead, as both Amar and Lash urge, one
ought to also turn to the reconstructionists-women and men who were
central in giving shape to the Fourteenth Amendment. Only in this way
may jurists do away with what Amar calls "selective ancestor worship, ' 3
3
the practice of relying entirely, if not excessively, on the founding fathers
in constitutional interpretation instead of including such revolutionary
figures in American constitutional history as John Bingham, Frederick
Douglass, and Harriet Beecher Stowe.
Taking up arms in response to Amar and Lash's respective calls to
action, I endeavor to turn the focus toward a central character in the story
that was the Reconstruction: Frederick Douglass. This article will not
offer a general biographical survey of his life and times, but will instead
focus on Douglass's views on religion. 34 In particular, I will aim to ex-
trapolate from his writings and secondary historical sources any insight
that one may reliably draw about his philosophy on the interaction be-
tween, and the separation of, matters touching faith, governance, and
public life. The two guiding questions for consideration will be the fol-
lowing: (1) What may one conclude about Frederick Douglass's views
on the role of religion in the public square; and (2) with Douglass's phi-
32. "Mixed" cases are those in which free exercise issues predominate over others, including,
for instance, due process questions, equal protection concerns, and establishment issues. HENRY J.
ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM AND THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES IN THE
UNITED STATES 300 (6th ed. 1994).
33. AMAR, supra note 11, at 293.
34. For helpful background information on Frederick Douglass as a general matter, see WALDO
E. MARTIN, JR., THE MIND OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS (1984); FREDERICK DOUGLASS, MY BONDAGE
AND MY FREEDOM (William Loren Katz ed., Amo Press 1968) (1855); David William Blight, Keep-
ing Faith in Jubilee: Frederick Douglass and the Meaning of the Civil War (1985) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison) (on file with the Yale University Library);
William H. Clontz, An Analysis of the Political Career of Frederick Douglass, 1865-1895 (1976)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Idaho) (on file with the Yale University Library).
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losophy of church and state as the signpost, how could one address con-
temporary disputes arising under the Establishment Clause?
Thus, in Part III, I will outline three fundamental principles that one
may discern from the life and writings of Frederick Douglass. In Part IV,
I will review four Supreme Court cases and suggest how the Court could
have invoked Douglass to help resolve the establishment disputes on its
docket. The final Part will conclude with a few additional thoughts.
II. SELECTIVE ANCESTOR WORSHIP
ON THE SUPREME COURT
The forty-seven establishment cases to have ascended to the Su-
preme Court since incorporation may be divided into three categories.
First, those in which Supreme Court justices have invoked Jefferson or
Madison, or both, in order to give meaning to the Establishment Clause
and to answer the constitutional questions raised before the Court. Sec-
ond, cases where the Court expounded the scope and design of the Estab-
lishment Clause by referring in expansive fashion to the founders, fram-
ers, founding fathers, or to early colonial and founding history. Third,
cases in which the Court has relied wholly on precedent to resolve the
dispute, finding it unnecessary to turn to the founders or history neither
to substantiate its ruling nor to develop its understanding of the Estab-
lishment Clause. The first and second groups are distinguishable in that
the former includes cases in which the Court expressly names Jefferson
and Madison as an interpretative authority, whereas the latter consist of
cases in which the founding fathers and history in general serve as the
Court's source of reference.
Thus the Supreme Court's forty-seven establishment cases may be
distinguished from one another on the basis of their respective sources of
reference: (1) Jefferson and Madison; (2) founding fathers and history; or
(3) precedent. Yet each of these cases also shares in common a con-
spicuous void: no substantive reference to the framers and the ratifiers of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and no account of the Amendment's trans-
formative and enduring imprint upon the Establishment Clause.
A. Group I: Jefferson and Madison As Source of Reference
The Supreme Court's seminal pronouncement on the Establishment
Clause appears in Everson v. Board of Education.35 Everson is signifi-
cant for a number of reasons, notably the incorporation of the Establish-
ment Clause. But perhaps equally significant as a matter of constitutional
35. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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decisionmaking is that the Everson Court relied upon the views of Jeffer-
son and Madison to articulate the purpose of the Establishment Clause,
thereby establishing the framework for resolving future establishment
disputes.
Decided by a vote of five to four, Everson upheld a statute that re-
imbursed parents for the cost of bus transportation to private (including
parochial) schools. 36 Outlining a thorough revisionist history of the adop-
tion of the Establishment Clause, Justice Black addressed the core ques-
tion at issue: how to delineate "the line between tax legislation which
provides funds for the welfare of the general public and that which is
designed to support institutions which teach religion." 37 In assessing the
taxpayer's establishment claim, the Court reviewed the post-colonial pe-
riod in which the Clause was conceived, discussing the history of reli-
gious persecution in the colonies and the compelling impetus for state
neutrality at the founding.3 8 Early Americans, wrote the Court, "reached
the conviction that individual religious liberty could be best achieved
under a government which was stripped of all power to tax, to support, or
otherwise assist any or all religions, or to interfere with the beliefs of any
religious individual or group." 39 The experiences of the early Americans
in turn led to enshrining the First Amendment, which "requires the state
to be a neutral in its relation with groups of religious believers and non-
believers. 'Ao
The Court focused its attention on the views of Jefferson and Madi-
son, noting that these authorities must continue to inform the Court's
interpretation of the Establishment Clause. 41 The Court's review of Jef-
fersonian and Madisonian thought spans a number of pages, 42 coming
astonishingly close to declaring that the Court should rule in a particular
way only because Jefferson and Madison would have done so. Equally
fascinating is that the dissent, too, appealed to the views of Jefferson and
Madison.
Noticeably disappointed with the result, the dissent, led by Justice
Rutledge, lamented that the test for what constitutes establishment does
not remain "undiluted as Jefferson and Madison made it."'43 In Rutledge's
determination, religious education and observances in public schools and
36. Id. at 18.
37. Id. at 14.
38. Id. at 8-15.
39. Id. at 11.
40. Id. at 18.
41. Id. at 13.
42. Id. at 11-16.
43 Id at 44
[Vol. 28:239
Establishment Clause
public funding for private religious schools represented two "avenues
[that] were closed by the Constitution.,,44 And, adds Rutledge, because
these two important matters were settled long ago at the founding,
"[n]either should be opened by this Court. 45 What is perhaps most ex-
traordinary is that Rutledge invokes the founders as a short answer to the
establishment dispute in Everson. Nowhere in the Court's decision-
including dissenting opinions-does any justice make reference to the
reconstructionist transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment, nor to its
framers or ratifiers.
The following year, in 1948, the Court was again called upon to
speak to the Establishment Clause. Again, the Court leaned on Jefferson
and Madison to the virtual exclusion of other authorities. Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education46 concerned the validity of a "released
time" program, which allowed public school students whose parents had
completed the requisite permission forms to excuse themselves from
class in order to attend religious instruction conducted by private instruc-
tors. The instructors conducted their sessions in public school buildings
during regular school hours. The question at issue was whether a state
may use its tax-supported public school system to advance religious in-
struction.47
On the theory of incorporation, the Court concluded that the pro-
gram was clearly violative of the American theory of separationism:
"This is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-
supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their
faith., 48 To support its conclusion that the "released time" program was
unconstitutional, the Court turned to a familiar voice: "In the words of
Jefferson the clause against establishment of religion by law was in-
tended to erect 'a wall of separation between church and state.'- 4 9 No-
where in its opinion did the Court call upon any other historical authority
to substantiate this ruling. Rather, the inquiry began and concluded with
the founders, with no meaningful inquiry into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Engel v. Vitale50 is a third case that exemplifies the Court's propen-
sity to turn in blind faith to Jefferson and Madison. In Engel, the New
York Board of Education directed the district's principal to have all stu-
44. Id. at 63.
45. Id.
46. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
47. Id. at 204-05.
48. Id. at 210.
49. Id. at 211 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947)).
50. 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
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dents recite aloud the following morning prayer in the presence of a
teacher: "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee,
and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our
Country."51 The State Board of Regents had expressed an inspired hope
for its prayer: "We believe that this Statement will be subscribed to by all
men and women of good will, and we call upon all of them to aid in giv-
ing life to our program., 52 A number of parents promptly filed suit,
claiming that an official prayer in public schools violated the Establish-
ment Clause.
Justice Black invalidated the prayer. He asserted that "[w]e think
that the constitutional prohibition against laws respecting an establish-
ment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part of the
business of government to compose official prayers for any group of the
American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by
government." 53 This is the minimum, readers were told, because gov-
ernment imposition of religious prayer is precisely what led early colo-
nists to seek religious refuge in America.54 Resistance to such forms of
government intrusion is what prompted the revolution against the Crown,
wrote the Court.55 Indeed, explained Black, as his thesis took shape, Jef-
ferson and Madison, who "opposed all religious establishments by law
on grounds of principle, obtained the enactment of the famous 'Virginia
Bill for Religious Liberty' by which all religious groups were placed on
an equal footing so far as the State was concerned. 56
The Court, here again, invoked these two founding giants as a short
answer to giving meaning to the Establishment Clause. This would not
be troubling had the Court also looked to the important historical period
of the Reconstruction. But it neglected to do so. Instead, in its last sub-
stantive paragraph-having long discarded the possibility of any refer-
ence to the Fourteenth Amendment-the Court unveiled its clinching
argument as to why the Engel prayer contravened the Establishment
Clause: Madison would have thought so. 7
Equally instructive in this regard is Lynch v. Donnelly,58 in which
residents of Pawtucket filed suit against the city, contending that its an-
nual practice of erecting a Christmas display-which included a Nativity
51. Id. at 422.
52. Id. at 423.
53. Id. at 425.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 428.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 436.
58. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
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scene-violated the Establishment Clause. This local custom had
spanned at least forty years. The District Court59 and the Court of Ap-
peals 60 both sustained the challenge, permanently enjoining Pawtucket
from including the creche in its Christmas display. On review, the Su-
preme Court reversed, declaring that Pawtucket's display had not
breached the metaphorical wall separating church and state.6 '
The Court again drew upon history to substantiate its ruling. The
Constitution, stated the Court, does not "require complete separation of
church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any."62 In resolv-
ing present-day establishment disputes, the Court's interpretation of the
Establishment Clause must comport "with what history reveals was the
contemporaneous understanding of its guarantees. 63 The most important
history for the Court, in this regard, must necessarily be the history of the
founding:
The interpretation of the Establishment Clause by Congress in 1789
takes on special significance in light of the Court's emphasis that
the First Congress "was a Congress whose constitutional decisions
have always been regarded, as they should be regarded, as of the
greatest weight in the interpretation of that fundamental instru-
ment.64
According to the Court, the founders would have consented to the
display, given their employment of congressional chaplains and their
declarations of religious faith at Thanksgiving.65
The Court then listed a number of examples that supported the
proposition that "there is an unbroken history of official acknowledg-
ment by all three branches of government of the role of religion in
American life from at least 1789. " 66 Executive orders and other official
presidential announcements have included religious terms, as have con-
gressional pronouncements and actions. 67 Moreover, the national motto
"In God We Trust" and the language "One nation under God" in the
59. 525 F. Supp. 1150 (D.R.I. 1981).
60. 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982).
61. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 694.
62. Id. at 673.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 674 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 174-75 (1926)).
65. Id. at 674-75.
66. Id. at 674.
67. Id. at 676.
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Pledge of Allegiance lay bare the government's acknowledgement of
America's religious heritage.68
In addition to its general references to the founders, the Court made
specific reference to Madison, whose practice it was to issue religious
Thanksgiving proclamations. 69 But as the Court charted the reasons
why the display did not violate the Establishment Clause, it did not make
mention of the Fourteenth Amendment, neither applying the Amendment
to the facts in Lynch nor even contemplating how the Amendment's
framers and ratifiers would have reacted to the display, as the Court had
investigated at great length and in remarkable detail with respect to the
founders. The Court would have been better advised to also inquire into
the meaning of the Establishment Clause in the context of the Recon-
struction instead of, as it did, confining its deliberation to the original
meaning of the Clause.
Consider also Wallace v. Jaffree,70 which is particularly helpful in
illustrating the extent to which the Supreme Court has steered clear of
invoking the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment as Es-
tablishment Clause interpretational authorities. The Wallace Court in-
validated an Alabama statute authorizing public school teachers to hold a
one-minute period of silence for voluntary prayer as clearly violative of
the Establishment Clause. 7' Because the statute subjected students to a
form of religious indoctrination, reasoned the Court, even if students
were free to use this time for either meditation or voluntary prayer, the
state conveyed the improper impression of state endorsement of religion
in public schools.72
In this case, Alabama argued that the Clause did not apply to states
and that therefore states were not bound by the nonestablishment rule.
Having reviewed a number of Court opinions and undertaken historical
research into the Establishment Clause, the District Court agreed with
Alabama and concluded that the Clause did not impose any barrier to
Alabama's establishment of an official religion.73 The appellate court
reversed the District Court, unequivocally rejecting its view of incorpora-
tion.74
With this opportunity to discuss the Establishment Clause's equal
force of application upon states as upon the federal government, the
68. Id.
69. Id. at 675 n.2.
70. 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
7 1. Id. at 60-6 1.
72. Id. at 59-60.
73. Id. at 45.
74. Id. at 46.
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Court, through Justice Stevens, proceeded to review the history of incor-
poration. The Court listed a number of cases in which the Clause had
been applied against states and mentioned the due process notion under-
pinning the theory of incorporation. 75 But, significantly, the Court did not
cite those individuals who were central to crafting the amendments that
made incorporation possible. Moreover, the Court did not describe in any
great detail how the reconstructionist vision of a new America changed
not only the Constitution in general, but the Establishment Clause in par-
ticular. Instead, the Court-in the very passage in which it reviewed in-
corporation-made reference to Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance
Against Religious Assessments.7 6
In a strong dissent in Wallace, Justice Rehnquist concluded that the
Establishment Clause serves to prohibit a single federal religion so as not
to ally the government with one particular denomination over another.77
Rehnquist reached this conclusion by first expounding the history of the
Establishment Clause, reciting the events leading to its drafting and also
noting the determinative influence of James Madison. 78 As evidence of
Rehnquist's reliance upon the intentions of the founders to inform his
establishment views, consider his opening remarks: "It is impossible to
build sound constitutional doctrine upon a mistaken understanding of
constitutional history, but unfortunately the Establishment Clause has
been expressly freighted with Jefferson's misleading metaphor for nearly
40 years., 79 According to what Rehnquist views as a proper reading of
history, the Clause does not "require government neutrality between re-
ligion and irreligion nor [does] it prohibit the Federal Government from
providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion. There is simply no historical
foundation for the proposition that the Framers intended to build the
'wall of separation' that was constitutionalized in Everson."80 In his tex-
tualist and intentionalist dissent, Rehnquist called upon luminaries Jef-
ferson and Madison-but not the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment-to advance his theory of accomodationism.
As a final example of the Supreme Court's selective ancestor wor-
ship, Lee v. Weisman81 bears mention. In Lee, a middle-school principal
invited a rabbi to deliver a commencement prayer. A graduating stu-
dent's father subsequently sought a permanent injunction prohibiting the
75. Id. at 50-55.
76. Id. at 53 n.38; 8 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 29.
77. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106, 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
78. Id. at 92-108.
79. Id. at 92.
80. Id. at 106.
81. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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principal from inviting a member of the clergy to deliver a prayer in fu-
ture graduation exercises. In affirming the lower court's grant of the in-
junction, the Court held that allowing prayer as part of official public
school attendance violated the Establishment Clause. 2
On behalf of the Court, Justice Kennedy outlined for readers what
precisely the First Amendment means. Kennedy turned to Madison, "the
principal author of the Bill of Rights, ' 3 and cited his Memorial and Re-
monstrance Against Religious Assessments as his interpretational author-
ity.84 In addition, Kennedy appealed to legal scholarship 5 and social sci-
ence research to support his ruling.86 The Court, through Kennedy, in-
voked a multitude of sources in interpreting the Establishment Clause,
but it did not turn to the framers or ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. In his concurrence, Justice Souter, too, appealed to Madison and
the framers.87 And, like Kennedy, Souter did not look to the revolution-
ary framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
These are but six illustrations of the Supreme Court's inclination to
turn to Jefferson and Madison as a source of reference in elucidating the
proper understanding of the Establishment Clause. To be sure, there are
several other cases that fall in this first group of establishment cases. 88
B. Group II: The Founding Fathers and History
As Source of Reference
This second group of cases numbers roughly the same as those in
the first. Whereas the first group consists of instances in which the Court
named Jefferson and Madison as its decisional authority, the second
82. Id. at 598-99.
83. Id. at 590.
84. Id.; 8 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 29
85. Lee, 505 U.S. at 589.
86. Id. at 593-94.
87. See id. at 612-16.
88. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004); Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S.
203 (1997); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Capitol
Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995); Bd. of Educ. of Kirvas Joel Vill.
Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994); County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492
U.S. 573 (1989); Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); Marsh v. Chambers, 463
U.S. 783 (1983); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228
(1982); Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Ny-
quist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403
U.S. 602 (1971); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970); Sch. Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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group comprises suits in which the founding fathers and history in gen-
eral serve as the Court's source of reference.
A typical example is County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liber-
ties Union.89 Allegheny concerned the constitutionality of two holiday
displays-one was a creche and the other was an 18-foot Chanukah me-
norah-placed on public property in Pittsburgh. The local chapter of the
ACLU filed an establishment suit seeking a permanent injunction barring
the county from displaying these holiday symbols on public property.
The Court ruled that the county, in displaying the creche, violated
the Establishment Clause by endorsing a well-known Christian symbol
which communicated a religious message. 90 The Court had greater diffi-
culty resolving the constitutionality of the menorah. Consider the follow-
ing passage from the Court's opinion:
The display of the Chanukah menorah in front of the City-County
Building may well present a closer constitutional question. The me-
norah, one must recognize, is a religious symbol: it serves to com-
memorate the miracle of the oil as described in the Talmud. But the
menorah's message is not exclusively religious. The menorah is the
primary visual symbol for a holiday that, like Christmas, has both
religious and secular dimensions. Moreover, the menorah here
stands next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty. While no
challenge has been made here to the display of the tree and the sign,
their presence is obviously relevant in determining the effect of the
menorah's display. The necessary result of placing a menorah next
to a Christmas tree is to create an 'overall holiday setting' that
represents both Christmas and Chanukah-two holidays, not one. 9 1
The Court concluded that the creche display violated the Estab-
lishment Clause but that the menorah display did not violate the Clause,
"given its particular physical setting. 92
In addition to referring to a number of scholarly publications, the
Court took great care to properly define the terms, such as menorah,93
Talmud,94 and others, used in its opinion.95 The Court also discussed the
founding historical dominance of the Christian faith, a status that has
since evaporated under the weight of pluralism and emergent notions of
89. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
90. Id. at 598-601.
91. Id. at 613-14.
92. Id. at 621 (internal citations omitted).
93. Id. at 583 n.14.
94. Id. at 583 n.13.
95. Id. at 583-87.
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religious liberty and equality. 96 In uncovering for readers the modem
meaning of the Establishment Clause, various members of the Court
cited early colonial history, 97 the process of disestablishment during the
1800s in Massachusetts,98 and early presidential proclamations.99 But
none of the justices looked to the Reconstruction or to the framers and
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment to inform their discussion of the
meaning of the Establishment Clause.
Similarly, Lemon v. Kurtzman °° may be cataloged in Group II.
Lemon decided two cases jointly: Lemon v. Kurtzman, arising from
Pennsylvania,' 0 1 and Early v. DiCenso, from Rhode Island. 10 2 Both cases
concerned the use of public funds in parochial schools. 0 3 Pennsylvania
had reimbursed nonpublic elementary and secondary schools for the cost
of teachers' salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials. 0 4 Rhode Is-
land's comparable statute provided for supplementing by fifteen percent
the annual salary of nonpublic elementary school teachers. 0 5 The Lemon
plaintiffs condemned both statutes as unlawful state establishments of
religion. 0 6 The Court agreed, unveiling what has become known as the
Lemon test. 107
96. Id. at 589-90.
97. Id. at 604 n.54.
98. Id. at 648 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
99. Id. at 671 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
100. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
101. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 310 F. Supp. 35 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
102. Early v. DiCenso, 316 F. Supp. 112 (D.R.I. 1970).
103. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607, 609.
104. Id. at 609.
105. Id. at 607.
106. Id. at 606.
107. In order to pass constitutional muster under the Court's three-pronged Lemon test, the
government action in question must not exhibit any of the following: (1) a religious purpose; (2) a
primary effect that either advances or inhibits religion; or (3) an excessive entanglement between
government and religion. Id. at 612-13. After Lemon, the Court revised the test into a two-pronged
analysis in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997). As a result, the government action in question
must neither: (1) exhibit a religious purpose; nor (2) have a primary effect that either advances or
inhibits religion. In determining the primary effect of the action, the Court will pose up to four ques-
tions to guide its analysis, including whether there exists the potential for political divisiveness and
whether the action results in governmental indoctrination, defines recipients by reference to religion,
or creates an excessive entanglement. See id. at 234-35.
The Lemon test has withstood an onslaught of criticism at the hands of both academics, see,
e.g., Phillip N. Yannella, The Death-Knell for the Lemon Test? Assessing the Constitutionality of the
Charitable Choice Act of 2001, I1 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 181 (2001); Stuart W. Bowen,
Jr., Is Lemon a Lemon?, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 129 (1990); Kenneth Mitchell Cox, The Lemon Test
Soured: The Supreme Court's New Establishment Clause Analysis, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1175 (1984);
Thomas R. McCoy, A Coherent Methodology for First Amendment Speech and Religion Clause
Cases, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1335 (1995); Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment
Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463; Raul M. Rodriguez, God is Dead: Killed by Fifty Years of Estab-
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Making his determination on behalf of the Court, Chief Justice
Burger invoked the intentions of the authors of the Establishment Clause.
In invalidating both statutes, the Chief Justice relied upon the framers
who, Burger believed, did not simply prohibit state involvement with a
single religion over others but with religion in general.10 8 Moreover, the
concurrences of Justices Douglas'0 9 and Brennan" 0 admit of a parallel
inclination, for they too summoned the views of the framers to substanti-
ate their joining in the Court's judgment. But no one on the high court
looked to the intentions or views of the framers or ratifiers of the Recon-
struction era.
A further illustration of the second group comes from Larkin v.
Grendel's Den.' In Larkin, a Massachusetts statute authorized schools
and churches to veto the issuance of a liquor license to an establishment
within a 500-foot radius of the objecting school or church. 12 A church
located ten feet from an applicant restaurant registered its objection, and
the restaurant was consequently denied permission to serve alcohol on its
premises.' 3 The restaurant filed suit against Massachusetts, arguing that
the statute violated the Establishment Clause.' 4
The Court ruled that the statute clearly breached the terms of the
Establishment Clause. 1 5 A private, nongovernmental entity could not
retain such powers as afforded to school or church institutions under the
Massachusetts statute in question, explained the Court." 6 This private
veto embodied an unmistakably unconstitutional delegation of powers, as
it constituted precisely what the Establishment Clause was conceived to
lishment Clause Jurisprudence, 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1155 (1992); Mark V. Tushnet, Reflections on
the Role of Purpose in the Jurisprudence of the Religion Clauses, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 997
(1985-86), and Supreme Court justices, see, e.g., Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644-45
(1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); County of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union, 492 U.S. 573, 655
(1989) (Kennedy, J. concurring in part, dissenting in part); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 429 (1985) (O'Connor, J., dissent-
ing); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 684-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). For a thorough review of Lemon beyond the
scope offered in these pages, see R. Craig Wood & Michael C. Petko, Assessing Agostini v. Felton
in Light of Lemon v. Kurtzman: The Coming of Age in the Debate Between Religious Affiliated
Schools and State Aid, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L. 1, 1-7.
108. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612.
109. Id. at 628-34.
110. Id. at 642-46.
111. 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
112. Id. at 117.
113. Id. at 117-18.
114. See id.
115. Id. at 126-27.
116. Id. at 118-23.
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prevent: a fusion of state and religious functions." 7 The statute also col-
lapsed under the stress of the Lemon test, which demands in part that the
government action exhibit a primary effect that does not advance religion
(and the Massachusetts law did indeed advance religion, wrote the
Court l 8 ) and that does not result in an excessive entanglement between
government and religion (a standard that the statute also failed to
meet 19).
What is instructive for our purposes is the Court's discussion about
the purpose and meaning of the Establishment Clause. "The purposes of
the First Amendment guarantees relating to religion were twofold: to
foreclose state interference with the practice of religious faiths, and to
foreclose the establishment of a state religion familiar in other eighteenth
century systems.' 120 This statement seemed innocuous enough, until the
Court revealed the framers as its authority for this statement. 121
Indeed, it is the Jeffersonian metaphor of the "wall" separating
church and state that principally informed the Court's conception of the
Establishment Clause. 122 Moreover, the Court summoned the "framers,"
who, in the Court's terms, could not possibly have "set up a system of
government in which important, discretionary governmental powers
would be delegated to or shared with religious institutions."'' 2 3 Maybe
not, but the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment had their
own comprehension of the relationship between state and religious insti-
tutions. These individuals infused new meaning into the Establishment
Clause. They transformed the Clause. And while it is true that they, too,
would likely have disapproved of the kind of governmental delegation
evident in the Massachusetts statute in question in Larkin, the Court
chose not to explore their views and beliefs. This, I believe, is too narrow
117. Id. at 126.
118. Id. at 125-26.
119. Id. at 127.
120. Id. at 122.
121. Id. at 122-23.
122. Many scholars and observers-including the Court here in Larkin-have mistakenly
attributed the metaphor of the "wall" to Thomas Jefferson. Roger Williams, who was banished from
Massachusetts and later founded what became a citadel of religious liberty, Rhode Island, first ar-
ticulated the metaphor of the "wall." TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER
WILLIAMS AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 4-5, 82-83 (1998) (outlining Roger Williams' philosophy of
church and state). Jefferson may be more accurately viewed as having borrowed Williams' powerful
phrase.
123. Larkin, 459 U.S. at 127.
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an appreciation of the Establishment Clause, for it denies the significance
of the rebirth of the nation's first liberty. 2
4
Third, consider Mueller v. Allen, 25 where the Court assessed the
validity of a Minnesota statute that allowed state taxpayers to deduct ex-
penses incurred in providing tuition, textbooks, and transportation for
their children attending elementary or secondary school. As a widely ap-
plicable program, the statute applied to parents of children who attended
public schools, private nonreligious schools, and parochial schools.1 26 A
group of Minnesota taxpayers brought an establishment suit against two
parties: (1) parents who had taken a tax deduction for expenses incurred
in sending their children to parochial schools; and (2) the state Commis-
sioner of Revenue. 27
Over a vigorous dissent, the Court upheld the statute. The Court
applied the Lemon test to the statute, finding the statute to have a secular
purpose,128 a primary effect that did not advance the religious or religion
in general, 29 and a practical result that did not excessively entangle the
spheres of state and religion.' 30 Specifically, the statute exhibited a num-
ber of valid secular purposes, including the development of a well-
educated citizenry.'13 Also, the statute could not be said to discriminately
advance religion because the program was available to all parents,
whether or not their children attended public schools or private
schools. 32 Finally, in satisfying the last component of the Lemon test, the
statute did not produce a constitutionally violative fusion of state and
religious functions.'33
The Mueller majority took great care in its opinion to outline the
meaning of the Establishment Clause. 134 The Court relied on the nation's
founding history and the views of the founding fathers. But, signifi-
cantly, the Court did not take even a moment to discuss the meaning of
the Establishment Clause in the context of the Fourteenth Amendment.
This myopic view of the Constitution does an injustice not only to estab-
124. This phrase derives from the scholarship of William Miller. WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE
FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1985).
125. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
126. Id. at 397.
127. Id. at 392.
128. Id. at 394.
129. Id. at 402.
130. Id. at 403.
131. Id. at 393-95.
132. Id. at 394-403.
133. Id. at 394-96.
134. Id. at 399-400.
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lishment jurisprudence but equally to the American constitutional tradi-
tion.
Two other instances of note include Walz v. Tax Commission of the
City of New York 135 and Board of Education of Kirvas Joel Village
School District v. Grumet.136 In Walz, a New York real estate owner
sought an injunction to prohibit the Tax Commission from extending
state property tax exemptions to religious organizations for religious
properties that were used exclusively for religious worship. 37 The plain-
tiff argued that the exemption to church property indirectly required him
to support religion and the religious, and therefore violated the Estab-
lishment Clause.' 38
The Court disagreed, recognizing that "there is room for play in the
joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious
exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.' 39 The
City of New York, explained the Court in sustaining the exemption, "has
not singled out one particular church or religious group or even churches
as such; rather, it has granted exemption to all houses of religious wor-
ship within a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public
corporations which include hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific,
professional, historical, and patriotic groups."' 140
To defend its conclusion, the Court appealed to the early 1800s and
to Congress, which has since its earliest days authorized statutory ex-
emptions for religious organizations.14 1 In 1802, for instance, explained
the Court, the seventh Congress exempted churches from a taxing statute
applied in the County of Alexandria, Virginia. Comparable exclusions
followed in 1813, when Congress enacted a number of real and personal
property assessments that specifically excluded church property, and in
1870, when Congress exempted all churches from taxes in the District of
Columbia. 142 Given that such enactments were not violative of the Estab-
lishment Clause at that time, the Court reasoned that it could not plausi-
bly invalidate the New York exemption. 143
135. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
136. 512 U.S. 687 (1994).
137. Walz, 397 U.S. at 666.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 669.
140. Id. at 673.
141. Id. at 677.
142. Id. at 677-78.
143. Id. at 677-80.
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The Court did not discuss the Fourteenth Amendment and its trans-
formative impact upon the Establishment Clause, not even when the
Court discussed the central meaning of the Clause. 4
4
In Grumet, a New York statute created a special school district for a
religious enclave, Satmar Hasidim. 45 New York taxpayers and an asso-
ciation of state school boards filed suit on establishment grounds.
146
Writing for the Court, Justice Souter declared that the statute violated the
requirement of government neutrality that underscored the Establishment
Clause. 147
Souter, who typically cites the founding fathers as authority for his
establishment pronouncements, did not this time turn to such beacons as
Madison or Jefferson. But neither did he look to the framers or ratifiers
of the Fourteenth Amendment for guidance in discerning the meaning of
the Establishment Clause in order to more properly and historically faith-
fully resolve the dispute before the Court.
Several other cases may also be filed under this second heading,
cases in which the Court has looked to the founding fathers and history
as a source of reference for declaring the reach of the Establishment
Clause. 148
C. Group Il." Precedent As Source of Reference
In this third and final category of cases, the Supreme Court has re-
lied principally on precedential authority to give meaning to the Estab-
lishment Clause. Jefferson, Madison, and the founding fathers do not
figure prominently in the Court's delineation of the permissible and the
impermissible under the Establishment Clause. Other sources of refer-
ence may also include academic resources.
A representative illustration is Zorach v. Clauson.'49 The facts in
Zorach are strikingly similar to the dispute in McCollum, in which the
144. Id. at 669.
145. 512 U.S. 687, 690 (1994).
146. Id. at 694.
147. Id. at 705.
148. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004); Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); Rosenberger v. Rector and
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992); Edwards v.
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987); School District of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373
(1985); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984); Marsh v.
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982); Comm. for Pub. Educ. and
Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Sch.
Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962);
Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
149. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
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Court invalidated a program permitting Illinois public school students to
attend religious instruction conducted by private instructors.' 50 In
Zorach, New York City had a "released time" program under which pub-
lic school students, with parental authorization, could be released from
class during regular school hours in order to participate in religious in-
struction. However, unlike the program in question in McCollum, the
New York program did not provide for religious instruction on public
school grounds; students attended religious instruction at religious cen-
ters, away from school buildings and grounds.151
The Zorach Court upheld this particular form of "released time"
program. 152 On the strength of its observations that the New York pro-
gram involved neither religious instruction on public school premises nor
the expenditure of public funds in support of religious instruction-and,
importantly, that all costs were borne by the sponsoring religious institu-
tions' 5 3 -the Court distinguished this case from McCollum. 54 In its opin-
ion, the Court did not invoke a non-precedential interpretational author-
ity, citing only case law to reach its decision.
Another example is Board of Education v. Allen. 155 The state of
New York in Allen required local public school officials to loan text-
books free of charge to all students-including private school students-
in grades seven through twelve. The question before the Court was
whether the publicly mandated issue of textbooks to students attending
parochial schools constituted a law respecting an establishment of relig-
ion. 15
6
The Court, through Justice White, relied upon Everson to declare
that the Establishment Clause does not preclude a state from evenhand-
edly extending the advantages of state laws to all citizens without regard
to their religious affiliation. 57 Moreover, because the New York law
merely democratized a general book loan program and did not directly
aim to extend funds or materials to parochial schools, but rather to par-
ents and children, 158 the Court found itself unable to rule that the law was
repulsive to the principle of nonestablishment. In its majority opinion,
the Court did not invoke a non-precedential interpretational authority,
150. Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948).
151. Zorach, 343 U.S. at 308-09.
152. Id. at 315.
153. Id. at 309.
154. Id. at 308-09.
155. 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
156. Id. at 238.
157. Id. at 242 (citing Everson, 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947)).
158. Id. at 243-44.
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looking neither to history nor theory. Nowhere in its opinion did the
Court refer to the framers or ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Hunt v. McNair 19 and Levitt v. Committee for Public Education and
Religious Liberty160 may also be included in this group. The Hunt Court
considered the legality of the South Carolina Educational Facilities Au-
thority Act, which established a body to assist institutions of higher edu-
cation to secure funding through the issuance of revenue bonds.' 6' The
Act prohibited the Authority from assisting institutions that sought fi-
nancing for buildings or facilities to be used for sectarian instruction or
religious worship.' 62 The establishment problem arose when the Author-
ity gave preliminary approval to a Baptist school's application for capital
improvements and completion of a dining hall.163
The Court upheld the Act. In applying the elements of the Lemon
test, the Court found that the Act exhibited a secular purpose, evidenced
a primary effect that neither advanced nor inhibited religion, and did not
foster an excessive entanglement with religion.
1 64
Likewise, the Court here did not invoke a non-precedential author-
ity, for example the founders, the framers, or history, whether colonial,
post-colonial, or from the Reconstruction. And again, the framers and
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment were imprudently left outside the
sphere of influence.
In Levitt, plaintiffs questioned the constitutionality of New York's
$28 million appropriation to reimburse private schools for expenses in-
curred in performing such functions as administering, grading, compil-
ing, and reporting examinations, and maintaining and reporting records
on student enrollment and health records. 65 Parochial schools were eli-
gible to receive reimbursements.' 66
The Court struck down the enactment under the Establishment
Clause on the following three principal bases: (1) The state awarded
grants directly to the religious schools; (2) there were no mechanisms to
ensure that the school examinations were free of religious instruction;
and (3) there was nothing preventing the school from engaging in reli-
gious indoctrination. 167 The essential inquiry, wrote the Court, "is
159. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
160. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
161. Hunt, 413 U.S. at 736.
162. Id. at 736-737.
163. Id. at 738.
164. Id. at 741-44.
165. Levitt, 413 U.S. at 474.
166. Id. at 476.
167. Id. at 479-80.
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whether the challenged state aid has the primary purpose or effect of ad-
vancing religion or religious education or whether it leads to excessive
entanglement by the State in the affairs of the religious institution."'" 8
The New York statute could not survive the Court's test. 169
Again, the Court neither called upon non-precedential sources nor
referred to the framers or ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment to in-
form its judgment.
Two other instances of note are Texas Monthly v. Bullock170 and Es-
tate of Thornton v. Caldor.17 1 In Texas Monthly, the Court reviewed a
Texas statute that exempted from sales tax "periodicals that are published
or distributed by a religious faith and that consist wholly of writings
promulgating the teaching of the faith and books that consist wholly of
writings sacred to a religious faith.' ' 172 Justice Brennan inquired whether
this exemption contravened the Establishment Clause.
"In proscribing all laws 'respecting an establishment of religion,"'
wrote Brennan, "the Constitution prohibits, at the very least, legislation
that constitutes an endorsement of one or another set of religious beliefs
or of religion generally."'' 73 The Court ruled that the Texas statute ran
afoul of the Establishment Clause:
Texas' sales tax exemption for periodicals published or distributed
by a religious faith and consisting wholly of writings promulgating
the teaching of the faith lacks sufficient breadth to pass scrutiny un-
der the Establishment Clause. Every tax exemption constitutes a
subsidy that affects nonqualifying taxpayers, forcing them to be-
come indirect and vicarious donors. Insofar as that subsidy is con-
ferred upon a wide array of nonsectarian groups as well as religious
organizations in pursuit of some legitimate secular end, the fact that
religious groups benefit incidentally does not deprive the subsidy of
the secular purpose and primary effect mandated by the Establish-
ment Clause. 174
The Court's Texas Monthly decision is particularly instructive inso-
far as it spent a great deal of time discussing the Establishment Clause
and its jurisprudential development over time. 75 Although the Court
168. Id. at 481.
169. Id. at 482.
170. 489 U.S. I (1989).
171. 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
172. Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at 14-15 (referring to TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.320 (Vernon
1982)).
173. Id. at 8.
174. Id. at 14-15 (internal citations omitted).
175. Id. at 8-13, 21-25.
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thoroughly reviewed the applicable case law, the Court did not discuss
the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on the Establishment Clause.
To be precise, the Court did not look to the framers and ratifiers of the
Fourteenth Amendment for guidance in giving meaning to the Clause.
The Caldor Court invalidated a Connecticut statute that provided
that "no person who states that a particular day of the week is observed
as his Sabbath may be required by his employer to work on such day. An
employee's refusal to work on his Sabbath shall not constitute grounds
for his dismissal."' 176 The Court ruled that the statute offered Sabbath ob-
servers an absolute right to refrain from working. In so providing, the
statute had a primary effect that impermissibly advanced a religious prac-
tice. 177 Therefore, it could not satisfy the Lemon test, which requires in
part that the governmental action in question remain neutral in its impact
upon religion. 178
The Court's relatively short opinion cited only precedential author-
ity as substantiation for its conclusion. When the Court explicated the
meaning of the Establishment Clause, it made no mention of the Four-
teenth Amendment, nor of its framers or ratifiers.
There are several other cases belonging to this third category in
which the Court has exhibited a similar decisional pattern. 1
79
In this Part, I have divided the Court's forty-seven establishment
cases into three groups based upon the principal source of reference de-
ployed to interpret the Establishment Clause. But each case bears the
mark of one shared feature: The Court has not, in any case, looked to the
framers or ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment to discern the meaning
of the Establishment Clause.
III. EXPANDING THE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE:
THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS
In the previous Part, I surveyed Supreme Court jurisprudence with
the objective of demonstrating that the Court, in deciding establishment
cases and in delimiting the four corners of the Establishment Clause,
turns to a closed universe of sources. First and most frequently, the Court
176. Caldor, 472 U.S. at 706.
177. Id. at 710.
178. Id. at 709-10.
179. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v.
Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Witters v. Washington, 474 U.S. 481 (1986); Aguilar v. Felton, 473
U.S. 402 (1985); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980);
New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125 (1977); Roemer v. Bd. of Pub. Works of Md., 426 U.S.
736 (1976); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
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relies upon the views of Jefferson and Madison. Second, the Court in-
vokes the founding fathers as well as colonial and founding history to
substantiate its reading of the Clause. The third standard source of refer-
ence for the Court is precedential authority.
For our purposes, what is worthy of note is that the Supreme Court
fails to examine the Establishment Clause through a reconstructionist
lens. By casting aside the framers and ratifiers of the transformative
Fourteenth Amendment, the Supreme Court deprives the Establishment
Clause of its full scope and meaning.
Frederick Douglass is one such figure from the Reconstruction era
who should be looked upon as an authority on the Clause much like Jef-
ferson or Madison. In this Part, I will examine the thought of Frederick
Douglass as it relates to the following three principal issues: (1) estab-
lished churches, or state religion; (2) religious equality and egalitarian-
ism; and (3) religion and education. I will outline each one in turn, be-
ginning with Douglass's views on established churches. I shall then, in
the following Part, apply Douglass's views on religion to recent Supreme
Court cases.
A. Established Religion
Frederick Douglass was a deeply religious man. Having found God
at age thirteen, Douglass strived to live what he perceived to be God's
way as well as to encourage others do the same. 18 But as he grew older,
he witnessed the corruption of the Christian faith.181 Slave owners and
friends of slavery would trumpet their own righteousness in the same
breath as they would speak of the Bible, somewhere along the way, be-
lieved Douglass, losing sight of the command of their Lord. 182 Yet they
honestly believed they were committing no wrong in the trade of flesh,
convinced that they would find nothing to argue otherwise in the teach-
ings of their faith.1 83
This occasioned a tremendous bitterness within Douglass, who saw
his faith and its tenets despoiled. Before him lay a conspicuous hypocrisy
among men claiming to do the work of his God. He understandably had
great trouble reconciling these two conflicting realities:
We claim to be a Christian country and a highly civilized nation,
yet, I fearlessly affirm that there is nothing in the history of savages
180. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 110-12 (1881).
181. Id. at 131-35, 150.
182. Id. at 132-34.
183. See id. at 134.
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to surpass the blood chilling horrors and fiendish excesses perpe-
trated against the colored people by the so-called enlightened and
Christian people of the South. It is commonly thought that only the
lowest and most disgusting birds and beasts, such as buzzards, vul-
tures and hyenas, will gloat over and pretty upon dead bodies, but
the Southern mob in its rage feeds its vengeance by shooting, stab-
bing and burning when their victims are dead.
184
Douglass continued, lamenting that what these individuals practiced
could not properly be called Christianity. 185 Indeed, to him, these women
and men were not Christians. They could not possibly be God-fearing
Christians, like him, who believed in all things good and noble and fair:
[B]etween the Christianity of this land, and the Christianity of
Christ, I recognize the widest possible difference-so wide, that to
receive the one as good, pure, and holy, is of necessity to reject the
other as bad, corrupt, and wicked. To be the friend of the one, is of
necessity to be the enemy of the other. I love the pure, peaceable,
and impartial Christianity of Christ: I therefore hate the corrupt,
slaveholding, women-whipping, cradle-plundering, partial and
hypocritical Christianity of this land. Indeed, I can see no reason,
but the most deceitful one, for calling the religion of this land Chris-
tianity. I look upon it as the climax of all misnomers, the boldest of
all frauds, and the grossest of all libels. Never was there a clearer
case of "stealing the livery of the court of heaven to serve the devil
in." I am filled with unutterable loathing when I contemplate the re-
ligious pomp and show, together with the horrible inconsistencies,
which everywhere surround me.186
Moreover, not only did these individuals enslave his people and de-
file his faith, but they exacted further religious harm upon African-
Americans by denying them the privilege of baptism. 87 Slavery-friendly
religious leaders denied the privilege because of African-Americans'
perceived unfitness for baptism, and the fear that the full Christian mem-
bership conferred upon baptized African-Americans would unduly dis-
turb the relationship between master and slave. 188 This further widened
184. Frederick Douglass, Address by the Hon. Frederick Douglass, Delivered in the Metropoli-
tan A.M.E. Church (January 9, 1894), in THE LESSONS OF THE HOUR 3, 5 (1894).
185. See id.
186. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, AN AMERICAN SLAVE: NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK
DOUGLASS 120 (The New American Library 1968) (1845).
187. Frederick Douglass, Address Delivered in the Congregational Church on the Twenty-First
Anniversary of Emancipation in the District of Columbia (April 16, 1883), in AN ADDRESS BY HON.
FREDERICK DOUGLASS 1, 10 (1883).
188. Id.
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the gulf that was growing between Douglass, on the one hand, and
American Christian practice, the church as an institution, and organized
Christianity, on the other.
Turning to the question of establishment, it is important to recall
that Douglass had not experienced life in an establishmentarian regime.
Born in 1818, Douglass had seen disestablishment reach fruition in Con-
necticut in the same year,1 89 in New Hampshire the following year in
1819,190 and when he was around fifteen years of age, in Massachusetts
in 1833,191 which marked the disappearance of the final establishment
jurisdiction in the United States.
However, Douglass did have extensive knowledge of and experi-
ence with at least the following two non-American established churches:
(1) the Church of England; and (2) the Church of Scotland. 192 Based
upon his views on these churches, 93 one can infer that he would not have
been a proponent of established churches. Let us examine his writings
and declarations on these churches.
Speaking in 1858, Douglass praised the virtues of the Church of
England, which was then, and remains today, the established church of
England. He contrasted the actions of the Church of England with regard
to slavery with the actions of American Christianity and concluded that
English Evangelical Christianity was a formidable foe of slavery, while
American Evangelical Christianity was a gentle, enriching friend to slav-
ery:
189. Connecticut disestablished Congregationalism as the preferred state religion in 1818. See
Arlin M. Adams & Charles J. Emmerich, A Heritage of Religious Liberty, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1559,
1637 (1989). This came about as the result of a referendum of residents who voted in favor of dises-
tablishment by a narrow margin of 13,918 to 12,364. EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, FAITH OF OUR FATHERS
120 (1987). The state enshrined this new rule in two provisions of the Declaration of Rights appear-
ing in its new Constitution. The first preserved religious freedom, CONN. CONST. of 1818, art. 1, § 3,
and the second guarded against the establishment of a Christian religion. CONN. CONST. of 1818, art.
1, § 4.
190. Colonial New Hampshire had established Congregationalism by law. Steven B. Epstein,
Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2100 (1996). Not
until the year 1819 did New Hampshire's official support of religion come to an end. LEONARD W.
LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 45 (2d ed. 1994). The state effected disestablishment through
the Toleration Act of 1819. MICHAEL S. ARIENS & ROBERT A. DESTRO, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN A
PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 53-54 (1996).
191. Massachusetts was the last state to fully terminate its official state support of religion.
After initially rejecting a disestablishment proposal in 1820, Massachusetts' voters later adopted a
disestablishment proposal in 1833, John Dinan, The State Constitutional Tradition and the Forma-
tion of Virtuous Citizens, 72 TEMP. L. REV. 619, 633 (1999), by a score often to one. Robert S. Peck,
The Threat to the American Idea of Religious Liberty, 46 MERCER L. REV. 1123, 1135 (1995).
192. Douglass spent nearly two years in Great Britain during 1845-47. See DOUGLASS, supra
note 180 at 289-319.
193. See infra text accompanying notes 194-96.
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My friends, it must be confessed that the slaves in our land have no
more dangerous an enemy than in the religious bodies of America.
In this respect, the anti-slavery movement in this country differs
very widely from the anti-slavery movement in England. In our
country, we find religion opposed to us, quoting scripture against
us, preaching sermons against us; but in England, religion was al-
lied to the cause of liberty. English Evangelical Christianity breaks
fetters. American Evangelical Christianity rivets fetters.
194
But one must be careful not to interpret Douglass's admiration of
the Church of England as an endorsement of state-sponsored religion.
His praise of the Church must be read in the context of the times in
which he spoke. In 1858, emancipation had recently taken hold in the
West Indies; the English had ceded to the force of freedom. Spurred to
action in part by the Church of England, the English answered the call
and produced a marvelous result:
Abolition was the act of the British Government. The motive which
led the Government to act, no doubt was mainly a philanthropic
one, entitled to our highest admiration and gratitude. The National
Religion, the justice, and humanity, cried out in thunderous indigna-
tion against the foul abomination, and the government yielded to the
storm. 195
This surprising outcome opened Douglass's eyes, emboldened him
to persist in his pursuit of virtue and all things right, and brought him
newfound hope for the possibility of liberty in his own land:
That the event we thus comemorate [sic] transpired in another coun-
try, and was wrought out by the labors and sacrifices of the people
of another nation, form no valid objection to its grateful, warm,
hearty, and enthusiastic celebration by us. In a very high sense, we
may claim that great deed as our own. It belongs not exclusively to
England and the English people, but to the lovers of Liberty and of
mankind the world over. It is one of those glorious emanations of
Christianity, which, like the sun in the Heavens, takes no cogni-
zance of national lines or geographical boundries [sic], but pours its
golden floods of living light upon all. In the great Drama of Eman-
cipation, England was the theatre, but universal and every where
194. Frederick Douglass, Freedom in the West Indies, Address delivered in Poughkeepdie, NY
(August 2, 1858), in 3 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 214, 241 (John W. Blassingame ed.
1985).
195. Frederick Douglass, The Significance of Emancipation in the West Indies, Address at the
Ontario County Agricultural Society's Fairgrounds (August 3, 1857), in 3 THE FREDERICK
DOUGLASS PAPERS 183, 207 (John W. Blassingame ed., 1985).
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applying principles of Righteousness, Liberty, and Justice were the
actors. The great Ruler of the Universe, the God and Father of all
men, to whom be honor, glory, and praise for evermore, roused the
British conscience by his truth, moved the British heart, and West
India Emancipation was the result. But if only Englishmen may
properly celebrate this great concession to justice and liberty, then,
sir, we may claim to be Englishmen, Englishmen in the love of Jus-
tice and Liberty, Englishmen in magnanimous efforts to protect the
weak against the strong, and the slave against the slaveholder.
Surely in this sense, it ought to be no disgrace to be an Englishman,
even on the soil of the freest people on the globe.' 96
In this regard, therefore, Douglass perceived that good things-
godly things--could result from established religion, given the great
sway held by the Church of England and its consequent success in con-
vincing, encouraging, and guiding Englishmen to see what justice com-
manded of them.
Nevertheless, although the Church of England met in Douglass's
eyes with praise for its support of emancipation, another established
church summoned only scorn and disdain within him. Douglass believed
that the Church of Scotland, also an established faith, was just as bad as
its American counterparts who had soiled the Christian faith by brandish-
ing its principles in defense of slavery.1 97 In a speech delivered in Scot-
land, Douglass unleashed his emotions fearlessly before the crowd as-
sembled to hear this great orator. He began:
As a general thing, when any body of men commit a single wrong
act in the name of religion, they almost invariably commit more sins
in defending that action than the original one itself. I think this has
been singularly the case in the present instance. I think I never saw
it more prominently illustrated than in the attempted defence [sic] of
the indefensible conduct of the Free Church of Scotland.' 98
Douglass continued, leveling charges at the Church:
1st, I charge the Free Church of Scotland with fellowshipping men-
stealers, as the type and standing representatives of our Lord and
Saviour Jesus Christ on earth.
196. Id. at 199.
197. See DOUGLASS, supra note 180, at 309-13; see infra text accompanying notes 198-200.
198. Frederick Douglass, Charges and Defense of the Free Church, Address at an Anti-Slavery
Soiree (March 10, 1846), in I THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 171, 172 (John W. Blassingame
ed., 1979).
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2d, I charge the Free Church of Scotland with accepting money
from well-known thieves to build her churches and to pay her min-
isters.
3d, I charge the Free Church of Scotland with sending a deputation
into a community of well-known thieves to beg money which they
had the best evidence was the result of the most foul plunder which
has ever disgraced the human family.
4th, I charge the delegation of the Free Church of Scotland with go-
ing into a land where they saw three millions of immortal souls, for
whom the Saviour poured out his blood on Calvary, reduced to the
condition of slaves-robbed of their just and God-given rights-
plundered of their hard earnings-changed from men into merchan-
dize-ranked with the lowing ox or neighing horse-subject to the
brutal control of rough overseers-herded together like brutes-
raised like cattle for the market-without marriage-without learn-
ing-without God-without hope-groping their way from time to
eternity in the dark-left to be consumed of their own lusts-
compelled to live in concubinage-punished with death, in some in-
stances, for learning to read the word of God; and yet that delega-
tion professed ministers of the Gospel never whispered a single
word of opposition to all this in the ear of the oppressor, or lifted up
one prayer in the congregation for the deliverance of these wretched
people from their galling fetters. The very idea is horrible, and
ought to make every ear tingle and every heart quiver with terror.
5th, I charge the delegation of the Free Church of Scotland with
having gone into the slave states and among men-stealers with a full
understanding of the evils such a course must inflict on the Anti-
Slavery movement,-they having been met and remonstrated with
by the Committee of the American and Foreign Anti-Slavery Soci-
ety, and appealed to by them in the most Christian and fraternal
manner, in the name of Christ and the perishing slave, not to go into
the South-that such a course would inflict a great and lasting in-
jury upon the cause of emancipation. 199
Douglass continued in this fashion, charging the Church with refus-
ing to preach against slavery, turning a deaf ear to bleeding slaves, and
misleading slaves into thinking that the Church was free, when in fact it
was doing the work of slaveholders. 20 0
199. Id. at 176-77.
200 Id- at 177-7R
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In the face of such observations about the horror that may be ex-
acted by religion and those proclaiming to be acting on behalf of his
God, Douglass was given pause to consider the relationship between
church and state. Though he had not given up on the state as an engine of
social progress, it was difficult for him to imagine that improved social
conditions would come about without the help and urging of the church,
as had been the case in the West Indies.0 1 Yet, to declare that the church
as an institution was an indispensable component for pushing the state
toward emancipation would have been nearly impossible for Douglass to
do, given the corruption of religion he witnessed at home. Perhaps the
most revealing statement Douglass uttered to this effect is the following
short statement, which carries with it sharp imagery and an even sharper
vision of what he saw as the spoiled scent of Christianity among the
slaveholding masses: "Hence, my friends, every mother who, like Mar-
garet Garner, plunges a knife into the bosom of her infant to save it from
the hell of our Christian Slavery, should be held and honored as a bene-
factress. '' 20 2 His aim, therefore, was to safeguard the sanctity of religion
and to keep it free of debasing influences.
In many ways, Frederick Douglass's philosophy of church and state
resembled the philosophy of Roger Williams, the founder of Rhode Is-
land. Williams, like Douglass, believed in the separation of church and
203state. But the impetus for this belief was not to protect the state from
the church, but instead to protect the church from the sullying reach of
the state. To Williams, the church was the garden and all else represented
204the wilderness. In order to retain the sanctity and inviolability of the
church as garden, it was necessary to shield it from negative, acidic in-
fluences, or from institutions or individuals who would breach the
imaginary wall separating the garden from the wilderness. 0 5
Williams espoused a resolute policy of religious liberty and was an
ardent detractor of established, state religion. The laws of his colony nei-
ther established a denominational church nor required compulsory
church attendance.20 6 Rhode Island welcomed all people to its colony,
201. See Douglass, supra note 195, at 241; Frederick Douglass, Oration Delivered in Corin-
thian Hall (July 5, 1852), in 2 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 359, 381 (John W. Blassingame
ed., 1979).
202. Douglass, supra note 194, at 204.
203. HALL, supra note 122, at 81-82.
204. Id. at 82-83.
205. See generally id.
206. ISAAC A. CORNELISON, THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO CIVIL GOVERNMENT IN THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 64 (Leonard W. Levy ed., Da Capo Press 1970) (1895).
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including nonconformists, Baptists, and Quakers, whom Williams per-
sonally disliked.20 7
Douglass, like Williams before him, wished to establish a protec-
tive cover around religious institutions. 208 He had seen them dishonored
and violated under the leadership of friends of slavery. The union of
church and state was therefore among the most undesirable of coalitions
for reasons that Douglass had himself witnessed. Thus, for the sake of his
faith and its followers, he too sought to erect a wall separating church
from state, though the wall would not serve the interests of the state but
would instead be raised in defense of the purity of the church, its doc-
trine, and its people.
B. Religion, Equality, and Egalitarianism
Although Douglass believed in the democratization of public insti-
tutions, he acknowledged the right of private institutions to close their
doors to the unwanted or those deemed unqualified for membership.
Therefore, while he saw integration of public spaces as the greatest ob-
jective, he recognized the inappropriateness of state action to infringe
upon or dictate practices in private corners.
A particularly fascinating dimension of Douglass's political thought
comes to us in his observations on the World's Fair, which was held later
in his life. Commenting that all the peoples of the world were to be rep-
resented at this festive occasion and appreciating that the World's Fair
was intended in part to acquaint the world's great cultures with one an-
other, he found it devastatingly unacceptable that his people-the
American Negro, as he called himself-were left uninvited and unrepre-
sented.209 In order for the World's Fair to have been accurately viewed as
a World's Fair, he thought, surely his people ought to also have been
seated at the metaphorical table of civilizations. 210 But they were not and,
for that, he accurately decries American liberty and American equality.
Read his powerful words below, in which he underscores the American
caste system:
While I join with all other men in pronouncing the Exposition itself
one of the grandest demonstrations of civilization that the world has
ever seen, yet great and glorious as it was, it was made to show just
this kind of unfairness and discrimination against the Negro.
207. LEO PFEFFER, CHURCH STATE AND FREEDOM 84-85 (2d ed. 1967) (1953).
208. See Douglass, supra note 201, at 377-8 1.
209. See Douglass, supra note 184, at 19-20 (1894).
210. See id.
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As nowhere else in the world it was hoped that here the idea of hu-
man brotherhood would have been fully recognized and most glori-
ously illustrated. It should have been, and would have been, had it
been what it professed to be, a World's Exposition. It was, however,
in a marked degree an American Exposition. The spirit of American
caste made itself conspicuously felt against the educated American
Negro, and to this extend [sic], the Exposition was made simply an
American Exposition and that in one of America's most illiberal
features.
Since the day of Pentecost, there has never assembled in any one
place or on any one occasion, a larger variety of peoples of all
forms, features and colors, and all degrees of civilization, than was
assembled at this World's Exposition. It was a grand ethnological
lesson, a chance to study all likenesses and differences. Here were
Japanese, Soudanese, Chinese, Cingalese, Syrians, Persians, Tuni-
sians, Algerians, Egyptians, East Indians, Laplanders, Esquimaux,
and as if to shame the educated Negro of America, the Dahomeyans
were there to exhibit their barbarism, and increase American con-
tempt for the Negro intellect. All classes and conditions were there
save the educated American Negro.
What a commentary is this upon our boasted American liberty and
American equality! It is a silence to be sure, but it is a silence that
speaks louder than words. It says to the world that the colored peo-
ple of America are deemed by Americans not within the compass of
American law and of American civilization. It says to the lynchers
and mobocrats of the South, go on in your hellish work of Negro
persecution. What you do to their bodies, we do to their souls.2 11
Justice, clearly to him, would have dictated an African-American
presence at the World's Fair. But this was not to be. As the archetypical
public square, the World's Fair should have included everyone, in Doug-
lass's view. But it did not, and in speaking of the Fair, one may read his
discussion of race as a fulcrum to religion. In public institutions and in
the public square, there can be no justifiable exclusion of religious
thought.
Nevertheless, the American caste system would persist to his great
displeasure, though not in all parts of the country, as he was doubtless
211. Id.
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delighted to note.' 2 Douglass was elated at the early steps of social pro-
gress and equality taking hold in the New England. In Massachusetts, he
was pleased with educational integration, as he was with the progress
made in Connecticut toward equal suffrage, which was also moving
ahead in New York and Pennsylvania. He explained:
The States which have legislated in behalf of the Temperance Re-
form, have also made movements toward recognizing our rights as
citizens thereof. But efforts on our own part have helped toward this
good result; in Massachusetts, mainly by efforts of some colored
citizens, one a member of this Council, 2 3 the last vestige of caste in
public schools has been abolished. In Connecticut, on the petition of
her colored citizens, led by a member of this Council, both houses
of the Legislature have done their share towards granting us equal
suffrage, and the Governor has recently strongly recommended the
same. In New York, through the efforts of a member of this Council
and of the President of our State Council, aided by the moving elo-
quence of another member of our Council, the popular branch of the
Legislature passed a vote in favor of equal suffrage, a vote for
which during the past twenty years we have petitioned and strug-
gled in vain. In Pennsylvania, a strong and able effort has been
made to obtain the Franchise by our colored brethren, and not with-
214out some signs of success.
Fair, equal, and impartial treatment is the objective, proclaimed
Douglass, however hard achieving, maintaining, and exhibiting this im-
partiality may be. Equality and impartiality must reign not only between
and among the races, but also between and among religions. The world's
eyes must remain fixed toward this goal, he urged, and all peoples must
keep struggling to reach it. And struggle they would, cautioned Doug-
lass, for seeing it through would be as difficult to do as it is for a slave
owner to do justice to his own slave. Douglass struck a resonant chord
with the following words:
Under the influence of adverse education and hereditary bias, few
things are more difficult than to render impartial justice. Men hold
up their hands to Heaven, and swear they will do justice, but what
are oaths against prejudice and against inclination! In the face of
high-sounding professions and affirmations we know well how hard
212. See infra text accompanying note 213.
213. Douglass is speaking here of the National Council of the Colored People.
214. Frederick Douglass, Address at the Proceedings of the National Council of the Colored
People (May 8, 1855), in 3 THE FREDERICK DOUGLASS PAPERS 51, 57 (John W. Blassingame ed.
1985).
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it is for a Turk to do justice to a Christian, or for a Christian to do
justice to a Jew. How hard for an Englishman to do justice to an
Irishman, for an Irishman to do justice to an Englishman, harder still
for an American tainted by slavery to do justice to the Negro or the
Negro's friends. 21
5
In the public sphere and across all public establishments-including
schools and government edifices and constructs-Douglass pursued
equality and egalitarianism with undying vigor. He was a true champion
of the masses. Thus in all things public and of a public fabric, including
places of food and lodging, the public square, and governmental struc-
tures, the rule could be nothing short of full equality. As he so declared:
The right of every American citizen to select his own society and
invite whom he will to his own parlor and table should be sacredly
respected. A man's house is his castle, and he has a right to admit or
refuse admission to it as he may please, and defend his house from
all intruders even with force, if need be. This right belongs to the
humblest not less than the highest, and the exercise of it by any of
our citizens toward anybody or class who may presume to intrude,
should cause no complaint, for each and all may exercise the same
right toward whom he will.
When he quits his home and goes upon the public street, enters a
public car or a public house, he has no exclusive right of occupancy.
He is only part of the great public, and while has the right to walk,
ride, and be accommodated with food and shelter in a public con-
veyance or hotel, he has no exclusive right to say that another citi-
zen, tall or short, black or white, shall not have the same civil treat-
ment with himself.216
But this fervor stopped at the foot of private institutions. On this
question, Douglass conceded that the state should not impose itself upon
217a person's personal wishes and preferences. To Douglass, the private
realm included such spaces as one's home-one's castle, as he termed
it-one's church group, and one's private organizational affiliations, for
218instance. The reach of the state could not extend into the private
sphere.
215. Frederick Douglass, Address at the Fourteenth Anniversary of Storer College (May 30,
1881), in JOHN BROWN 3, 11 (1881).
216. Frederick Douglass, Address to the People of the United States at a Convention of Col-
ored Men (September 24, 1883), in THREE ADDRESSES ON THE RELATIONS SUBSISTING BETWEEN
THE WHITE AND COLORED PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 3,20 (1886).
217. See id.
218. See id.
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C. Religion and Education
Douglass strongly believed that religious teachings had no place in
public classrooms. 2 19 But this resistance derived neither from an antago-
nism toward Christianity nor the lessons he had learned from his Bible
readings. Quite the contrary, Bible study was, for him, a replenishing
source of strength and reassurance. His opposition to the teaching of reli-
gious texts in public schools instead originated from what he observed to
be the disconnect between the preaching and practice of Christianity. We
may trace the roots of his beliefs to his distrust of public and religious
officials who discharged their duties in the name of their faith.
As a proponent of religious liberalism-which, to Douglass, signi-
fied a more human-centric philosophy of religion as opposed to the tradi-
tional God-centric philosophy of religion-Douglass was accused of in-
fidelity for a number of the manifestations of his religious philosophy.22 °
Two of his beliefs in particular merit attention, for they bring into focus
his religious liberalism and reveal the reasons for the disdain with which
some regarded him.
First, Douglass did not believe in divine providence, at least not to
the point that it would ultimately, by itself, abolish the institution of slav-
ery. Douglass instead held steadfastly to the conviction that the will of
God could only be fulfilled through human intermediaries, 221 who them-
selves needed to exhibit faith in the righteousness of their actions.
Douglass, for instance, himself a Christian, could feel only disgust
and revolt in the face of Christian churches that supported slavery and its
perpetrators. To him, the church had been corrupted by backward indi-
viduals-many of them ministers, in his view-who maintained and fur-
thered the cause of slavery contrary to what he believed was the will of
God. Keeping firm to his view that man determined his own course in
life and retained the choice of heeding or ignoring the callings and urg-
ings of God as man saw them, Douglass was not at all troubled by his
label as an infidel. So what, he snapped, if earthly creatures saw him as
such? 222 At the end of the day, he knew that he would be welcomed into
a righteous afterlife. Consider his words below, spoken in 1852:
For my part, I would say, welcome infidelity! welcome atheism!
welcome anything! In preference to the gospel, as preached by the
Divines! They convert the very name of religion into an engine of
219. See MARTIN, supra note 34, at 179.
220. Id. at 178-79.
221. Id. at 177.
222. Id.
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tyranny and barbarous cruelty, and serve to confirm more infidels,
in this age, than all the infidel writings of Thomas Paine, Voltaire,
and Bolingbroke put together have done! These ministers make re-
ligion a cold and flinty-hearted thing, having neither principles of
right action nor bowels of compassion. They strip the love of God
of its beauty and leave the throne of religion a huge, horrible, repul-
sive form. It is a religion for oppressors, tyrants, manstealers, and
thugs.223
Related to his disillusionment with the church was his view of re-
ligion in school classrooms. In addition to the contempt he suffered for
his rejection of providence, Douglass was criticized for his belief that the
Bible had no place in public schools. 22 4 To be sure, Douglass did not op-
pose reading and belief in the Bible, for, as he writes in another text with
palpable emotion, his introduction to the Bible gave him strength and
newfound insight into the human condition and the promise of an after-
life.225 Rather, Douglass's opposition to Bibles in public schools likely
stemmed from the disconnect he witnessed among citizens, profession-
als, and even religious leaders around him, on the one hand, and on the
other, between Christian moral philosophy and practice.
In a eulogy Douglass delivered of William Jay, a graduate of Yale
College and a close friend of his, Douglass expressed his condemnation
of "those who maintain the divine right of Christian white men to hunt
down and to hold the black man in slavery ... ,226 and hoped with all
his being and for the sake of the sacred institution of religion, that "Doc-
tors of Divinity shall find a better use for the Bible than in using it to
prop up slavery, and a better employment for their time and talents than
in finding analogies between Paul's Epistle to Philemon and the slave-
catching bill of Millard Fillmore .... ,,227 In even more forceful words,
though this time not in speech but in the written medium, Douglass gave
further shape to these thoughts:
I assert more unhesitatingly that the religion of the south is a mere
covering for the most horrid crimes,-a justifier of the most appall-
ing barbarity,-a sanctifier of the most hateful frauds,-and a dark
shelter under which the darkest, foulest, grossest, and most infernal
deeds of slaveholders find the strongest protection. Were I to be
223. Douglass, supra note 201, at 377.
224. MART[N, supra note 34, at 179.
225. DOUGLASS, supra note 180, at 110-11.
226. Frederick Douglass, Eulogy of the Late Hon. Wn. Jay, Delivered on the Invitation of the
Colored Citizens of New York City, in Shiloh Presbyterian Church (May 12, 1859), in EULOGY OF
THE LATE HON. WM. JAY 3, 12-13 (1859).
227. Id.
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again reduced to the chains of slavery, next to that enslavement, I
should regard being the slave of a religious master the greatest ca-
lamity that could befall me. For of all slaveholders with whom I
have ever met, religious slaveholders are the worst. I have ever
found them the meanest and basest, the most cruel and cowardly, of
all others.228
Indeed, nothing shocked Douglass more to the core of his being
than the corrosion and deterioration that had overcome the hearts and
minds of the leaders of his nation and of his faith.22 9 Having seen how
easily religion and the religious creed could be manipulated by malevo-
lent men and women, he wished to withhold from the champions of slav-
ery the chance to further damage his nation.
Specifically, by opposing the use of Bibles in public schools, he
hoped to deny slave-friendly teachers the opportunity to inculcate young
schoolchildren with perverse, twisted, and plainly backward interpreta-
tions of the Bible. Though wrongdoers would use the Bible to their un-
seemly advantage in advancement of their unjust aims, Douglass af-
firmed that:
[There is] no evidence that the Bible is a bad book, because those
who profess to believe the Bible are bad. The slaveholders of the
South, and many of the wicked allies at the North, claim the Bible
or slavery; shall we therefore, fling the Bible away as a pro-slavery
book? It would be as reasonable to do so as it would be to fling
away the Constitution. 230
To him, the Bible was a singular book that he deemed "the oldest
history, the truest philosophy, the purest system of morality, the ground-
work of all other truth, the book of laws on which is based all human
jurisprudence. '23 1
IV. FREDERICK DOUGLASS As SOURCE OF REFERENCE
In the interest of relocating the constitutional discourse from the
conventional narrative to a broader and more historically accurate analy-
sis of the meaning of the transformed Establishment Clause, the judiciary
should rely on Frederick Douglass and other reconstructionists as sources
of reference alongside, not instead of, such usual suspects as Jefferson
228. DOUGLASS, supra note 186, at 86-87.
229. See generally id.
230. Frederick Douglass, The Dred Scott Decision, Speech delivered, in part, at the Anniver-
sary of the American Abolition Society (May 14, 1857), in Two SPEECHES 27,45 (1857).
231. MARTIN, supra note 34, at 179.
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and Madison. As an illustration of how jurists might make use of recon-
structionist thought in expounding the Establishment Clause, we may
attempt to conclude by extrapolation how Douglass would have decided
modem Supreme Court cases on establishment-related disputes, armed
with the above outline of Douglass's vision of religion and how it relates
to general questions of establishment, equality, and education.
Let us therefore imagine for a moment that Frederick Douglass was
a justice of the Supreme Court at the time the following cases reached
the Court's docket. How would Douglass have ruled? Though it is cer-
tainly difficult to determine with certainty how Douglass would have
sided on contemporary questions of establishment, his philosophy of re-
ligion and its place in civil society may give us sufficient guidance to
arrive at a plausible conclusion. Admittedly, Douglass did not pronounce
himself on all constitutional questions of religious flavor. For instance,
one would find it difficult to place Douglass on the question raised in
Reynolds v. United States,232 a Utah case from 1878 that affirmed a con-
viction for bigamy. In Reynolds, the defendant invoked his Mormon reli-
gious beliefs as permitting him to practice polygamy, but the Court re-
fused to recognize this as an allowable defense.233 I believe this case
would have been difficult for Douglass to decide. Douglass would almost
certainly have been repulsed by bigamy, given his reverence for the insti-
tution of marriage and the lengths he went to fight in support of interra-
cial marriage. 4 But this case also tests his belief in the inviolability of
the private sphere. It is likely that Douglass would have ruled as did the
Court, but it is hard to say so conclusively, because of his conviction that
man is king in his home.235
Nonetheless, in the absence of sureness, let us proceed with a
thought experiment examining four cases that will help to illuminate
Douglass's philosophy in practice. In reviewing these cases, let us re-
member the original aim of this effort, which is to illustrate that the cen-
tral figures of the Reconstruction may be very effective resources in re-
solving disputes arising under the Bill of Rights. Before proceeding, I
note that I am not so much interested in the result of this hypothetical
investigation. Specifically, my concern is not necessarily whether, in ap-
plying Douglass's insights to Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we
reach a conclusion different from the one reached by the Supreme Court.
Rather, my interest is in broadening the sphere of influence on estab-
232.98 U.S. 145 (1879).
233. Id. at 165-66.
234. See MARTIN, supra note 34, at 220-21.
235. See supra text accompanying note 216.
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lishment matters, from a narrow focus on Madison and Jefferson, to a
more inclusive and historically accurate survey of available decisional
authorities.
A. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris
The dispute in Zelman concerned whether Ohio's voucher pro-
gram236 ran afoul of the Establishment Clause by covering tuition charges
for students attending private and religious schools.237 The Sixth Circuit
invalidated the state initiative, relying upon the Lemon test 238 and found
the program to have a primary effect of advancing and impermissibly
endorsing religion.239 The Supreme Court overruled, holding that the
voucher program did not violate the Clause.240
In reaching its decision, the divided Court relied on previous cases,
principally Mueller v. Allen, Witters v. Washington, and Zobrest v. Cata-
lina Foothills School District.24' Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the Court,
did indeed tip his hat to the Fourteenth Amendment, but only to note that
it is the mechanism through which the Establishment Clause applies to
the several states.242 Yet again, the Court failed to make reference to the
fathers of the Fourteenth Amendment in articulating the meaning of the
Establishment Clause. 243
Though the Court's majority opinion did not cite any reconstruc-
tionists, Justice Thomas's concurrence called upon the writings of Fre-
derick Douglass for the proposition that "education ... means emancipa-
tion. 2 44 Justice Thomas used this quote to sustain his own argument in
support of Ohio's voucher program. Having thoroughly considered
Douglass's writings as well as secondary materials on his life and beliefs,
I disagree with the suggestion that Douglass would have been a propo-
nent of vouchers. Douglass would have affirmed the Sixth Circuit's deci-
sion, parting ways with the Supreme Court majority. Two reasons lead
me to this conclusion.
First, Douglass was a strong supporter of public institutions insofar
as he saw in them the promise of democratizing America for all peoples.
236. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-.983 (West 2001).
237. 536 U.S. 639 (2002).
238. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 951-57 (6th Cir. 2000).
239. Id. at 961.
240. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 662-63.
241. See discussion supra Part II.
242. 536 U.S. at 647-49.
243. In his dissent, Justice Souter called upon both Jefferson and Madison to expound the
meaning of the Establishment Clause. 536 U.S. at 711-12 (Souter, J., dissenting).
244. 536 U.S. at 676 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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And the vision of a truly free public school-free of twisted secular mes-
sages, and fully integrated with students of both black and white cul-
tures-represented his model, his aim for social progress. He would
therefore have fought for the continued support and improvement of pub-
lic schools, and would have recoiled at the thought of public funds being
redirected from these institutions of promise to their private counter-
parts.245
Second, given his experience with ill-willed religious leaders,
Douglass would have been appalled at funds from the public fisc flowing
to private institutions, which could engage in teaching and preaching
what they pleased beyond the core state-imposed educational require-
ments. Yet Douglass would not have forbidden private religious schools
from operating. He would have conceded that private religious schools
have a place in the state and enjoy the right to operate, whatever their
message or mission. In this way, he was a libertarian. But he would have
drawn an exceptionally bright line at the prospect of funding these insti-
tutions from the public purse.246
B. Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia
Rosenberger247 is emblematic of the Supreme Court's tendency to
focus solely upon the views, words, and actions of the founding fathers
in giving meaning to the Establishment Clause instead of more broadly
considering the intentions of the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which forever changed the Establishment Clause.
Relying on the founders to ascertain the meaning of the Establish-
ment Clause, the Rosenberger Court held that a public university could
grant access to its facilities to student groups (including those of a sectar-
ian nature) on a religion-neutral basis without violating the Establish-
ment Clause.2 48 In a concurrence, Justice Thomas drew on the events of
Virginia's 1776 Convention and also on his interpretation of Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance to support his judgment. 249 To bolster his
decision, Justice Thomas also referred to the legislative enactments of
the First Congress,25 ° particularly the Northwest Ordinance of 1787,251
which sanctioned congressional land grants for denominational schools.
245. See discussion infra Part II.B.
246. See discussion infra Part II.C.
247. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
248. Id. at 863.
249. Id. at 854-57.
250. Id. at 862-63.
251. See Northwest Ordinance of 13 July 1787, reprinted in THE ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS
253, 253-56 (Gordon Lloyd & Margie Lloyd eds., 1998).
[Vol. 28:239
Establishment Clause
In retort, Justice Souter began his dissent by summoning the writings of
Madison, whose authority "is well-settled. 2 52 In dissent, Souter also
called upon the actions of the colonial Virginia legislature and Madison's
Memorial and Remonstrance. But he did so to substantiate the opposite
conclusion that Justice Thomas reached with the same evidence.
253
It may have served the Court well to consider the views of promi-
nent reconstructionists in expounding the scope and sense of the Estab-
lishment Clause. Frederick Douglass is but one of many who could have
served as a resource for the Supreme Court. Douglass, in my view,
would have resolved Rosenberger on two bases: (1) the nature of public
institutions; and (2) equality. His first thought would have concerned the
nature of the institution. Public institutions, to him, were not forums for
distinguishing among people or classes, and he would have found it in-
appropriate to exclude groups from such spaces. According to Doug-
lass's philosophy, public establishments should champion the cause of
equality and non-discrimination. Moreover as a tireless advocate of
equality for all groups and individuals, Douglass would have viewed this
dispute as one of equal access. Whether or not Douglass agreed with the
views of the religious organizations seeking access to the school facilities
would have been of no import to him in deciding this case. Consider, for
instance, that although he regarded Judaism as the observance of "detest-
able practices, 254 he nevertheless wished equal treatment, fairness, and
impartiality for Jews. 255 On these two bases-the nature of public institu-
tions and equal access-Douglass, too, like the Court, would have held
that the University of Virginia must grant open access to its facilities,
even to religious organizations.
C. School District of Abington Township v. Schempp
Abington256 decided two companion cases, 257 both of which asked
the Court to assess the propriety of daily religious exercises in schools.
In the first case, the Court considered a Pennsylvania law that required a
reading of at least ten Bible verses at the opening of the public school
day. 258 The statute exempted students whose parents submitted a written
request to excuse them from the daily readings. The Schempp family
252. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 868 (Souter, J., dissenting).
253. Id. at 868-74.
254. Douglass, supra note 230, at 45.
255. Douglass, supra note 215, at 11.
256. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
257. Schempp v. School Dist. of Abington Township, 201 F. Supp. 815 (1962); Murray v.
Curlett, 179 A.2d 698 (Md. App. Div. 1962).
258. Schempp, 201 F. Supp. at 816.
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sued the state to enjoin enforcement of the statute, arguing that its appli-
cation violated the Establishment Clause.259 In the companion case, a
Baltimore school had adopted a rule pursuant to a Maryland statute,
which provided for daily opening religious exercises. 260 The school man-
dated a daily morning reading from the King James Bible, a practice to
which a student's family objected on establishment grounds.26'
The Court wasted no time in striking down both enactments.262 The
Court went on to develop its decisional logic by summoning as authori-
ties the views of founding fathers and Madison's Memorial and Remon-
strance Against Religious Assessments, in particular.263 In fact, the Court
took great care to stress that the views of Madison and Jefferson "came
to be incorporated not only in the Federal Constitution but likewise in
those of most of our States. 264
Later, the Court again quoted Madison, this time for the proposition
that neutrality ought to govern state interaction with religious institu-
265 hwvr owrtions. Significantly, however, references to the founders were neither
preceded nor followed by any reference to the reconstructionists.
Had the Court turned to Douglass, it would have found a compel-
ling ally. Leaning on Douglass to substantiate and give weight to its de-
cision would have permitted the Court to not only diversify the voices
marshaled in support of its position but perhaps more importantly to bol-
ster the force of its judgment by expressly acknowledging the transfor-
mative impact of the Fourteenth Amendment on the Establishment
Clause.
Given his strident belief that the Bible has no place in a public
school,266 Douglass would have taken little time to likewise invalidate
these laws. It is important to note, however, that Douglass was not an
opponent of religion and, in fact, felt a great affinity to and drew great
warmth from his Bible readings. His resistance to Bible readings in pub-
lic schools arose out of his fear that men and women in positions of au-
thority-teachers of course were party to this group-could manipulate
the spirit and terms of this holy document into concurrence with their
own cruel vision of the world.
259. Id. at 818.
260. Murray, 179 A.2d at 699.
261. Id.
262. Abington, 374 U.S. at 205.
263. Id. at 213.
264. Id. at 214.
265. Id. at 225.
266. See supra text accompanying notes 224-25.
[Vol. 28:239
Establishment Clause
D. Marsh v. Chambers
In Chambers, a member of the Nebraska Legislature argued that its
practice of beginning each of its sessions with a prayer performed by a
chaplain and paid for by the state violated the Establishment Clause.267
The legislator sought an injunction to discontinue this long-standing
practice. He was successful in both lower courts,268 but lost his case at
the Supreme Court.
In upholding the legislature's chaplaincy practice, the Court drafted
an opinion that reads like a history textbook. "The opening of sessions of
legislative and other deliberative public bodies with prayer is deeply em-
bedded in the history and tradition of this country," described the Court,
adding that, "from colonial times through the founding of the Republic
and ever since, the practice of legislative prayer has coexisted with the
principles of disestablishment and religious freedom.' 269 Not only is this
practice common in the nation's courtrooms, explained Chief Justice
Burger for the Court, but this is an American tradition that the Continen-
tal Congress adopted in 1774.270 The First Congress, too, adopted this
policy. 271 It stands to reason, then, that the nation's founders did not re-
gard the chaplaincy as repulsive to the liberties they later enshrined in the
Establishment Clause.272 Therefore, wrote Burger, "historical evidence
sheds light not only on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment
Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that Clause applied to the
practice authorized by the First Congress-their actions reveal their in-
tent. , 27
3
Echoing a familiar refrain, like the earlier-discussed cases, Cham-
bers similarly fails to discuss the intentions of the framers and ratifiers of
the Fourteenth Amendment. Instead, the intentions of the founding fa-
thers occupy a conspicuously large part of the Court's opinion. The
Court invoked such prominent individuals as Madison 274 and Samuel
Adams 275 in reaching its decision. But nowhere do we read mention of
267. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
268. Id. at 783.
269. Id. at 786.
270. Id. at 787.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 790 ("It can hardly be thought that in the same week Members of the First Congress
voted to appoint and to pay a Chaplain for each House and also voted to approve the draft of the
First Amendment for submission to the States, they intended the Establishment Clause of the
Amendment to forbid what they had just declared acceptable.").
273. Id.
274. Id. at 788 n.8.
275. Id. at 791-92.
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their nineteenth century counterparts, who conceived of the Fourteenth
Amendment and, in later ratifying it, forever changed the fabric of
American democracy.
Frederick Douglass, in my view, would have disagreed with the
Court's disposition of this case. In light of his Williamsian philosophy of
the relationship between church and state,276 and given the terrors he had
witnessed around him carried out both by men of the cloth and men of
the state, such a close symbolic association between matters of faith and
the government as was evident in the Nebraska Legislature's practice
would have awakened his sense of wrong and impropriety. He would
have upheld the lower court judgments, finding the chaplain's prayer an
unacceptable union of church and state. But, importantly, his concern
would not have been with the encroachment of the church upon the realm
of public governance. More precisely, Douglass's concern would have
rested in preserving the purity of the garden, or the sanctity of religion
and things religious. 277
Despite Douglass's likely disagreement with the Court, it would
nevertheless have been advisable, for either of two reasons, for the Court
to refer to his and other reconstructionist views. First, the Court could
have strengthened its reasoning by rebutting the discomfort that Doug-
lass would have exhibited in the face of such an unholy union of personal
faith and public governance. Second, and more significantly, the Court
could have illuminated the transformative effect of the Fourteenth
Amendment on the meaning of the Establishment Clause and other fun-
damental rights and freedoms.
V. CONCLUSION
My survey of Establishment Clause jurisprudence since 1947-the
year in which the Court extended the reach of the Clause to states-has
illustrated a point of some consequence. In each of the forty-seven estab-
lishment cases to reach the Supreme Court docket, the framers and ratifi-
ers of the Fourteenth Amendment are conspicuously absent both in name
and spirit. While Professors Amar and Lash have made plain the impor-
tance of a reconstructionist lens to the elaboration of the liberties and
freedoms preserved in the Bill of Rights, jurists seemingly have yet to
embrace this detail.
To be sure, were it the case that jurists recognized the indispensa-
bility of the Reconstruction era to the central meaning of the Establish-
276. See supra text accompanying notes 203-08.
277. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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ment Clause, they would summon the words or views of the framers and
ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment with a frequency comparable to
their reference to the founding fathers or the framers of the Bill of
Rights. But this is not the case. Indeed, one would even be mistaken to
suggest that the Supreme Court invokes as its Establishment Clause deci-
sional or interpretational authority the founding fathers or the framers of
the Bill of Rights disproportionately more than the framers and ratifiers
of the Fourteenth Amendment. By its terms, such a comparison is
flawed, for the Court has never-through forty-seven establishment
cases since and including Everson in 1947-appealed to the words or
intentions of the framers or ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment in
contemplating the meaning of the Establishment Clause. Not once. In-
stead, the Court has regularly invoked the founding fathers or the framers
of the Bill of Rights, mostly Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, as
authorities to give meaning to the Establishment Clause. For reasons out-
lined compellingly by Professors Amar and Lash, such a myopic view of
the Establishment Clause fails to acknowledge the Reconstruction's
transformative imprint forever branded upon the Clause.
It is clear that the Supreme Court relies upon the founders to the
exclusion of the framers and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment. But
whether this narrow reliance embodies a glaring deficiency in establish-
ment jurisprudence or whether it has exacted a detrimental effect on es-
tablishment law--or has had any effect-is a question I shall leave for
another day. In order to properly venture such an investigation, one
would necessarily have to craft a well-defined understanding of the Four-
teenth Amendment and how it relates to the Establishment Clause.
Moreover, the legislative history from the Reconstruction would neces-
sarily form a central source of reference for any meaningful assessment
of the framers' and ratifiers' intentions.
In these pages I have examined the religious thought of Frederick
Douglass, an influential reconstructionist who helped give shape to the
modem Bill of Rights. I have outlined some principles that underpin his
philosophy on questions involving the intersection of matters of faith and
the state, hopeful that this effort will spur others to do the same, with
other reconstructionists as subjects, and with other issues of public con-
cern. I have also applied Douglass's beliefs to contemporary religious
establishment disputes. This was meant to accomplish two key objec-
tives: (1) to illustrate, generally, that reconstructionists may serve as
helpful resources to jurists in search of the intended meaning of constitu-
tional civil rights and liberties; and (2) to suggest, specifically, that the
life, times, and writings of Frederick Douglass may be a useful founda-
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tion for giving meaning and shape to the Establishment Clause. Indeed,
as establishment disputes continue to find their way through the judici-
ary, jurists would do well to look beyond Madison and Jefferson, ex-
panding the sphere of authority on constitutional meaning to include
Douglass and other reconstructionists.
